To be fair, they were on the offensive in 45 and usually the offensive has higher casualties unless they have a truly overwhelming advantage. In 45 the Soviets absolutely had the upper hand, but not nearly to the same level the Allied forces in the West had. They had to burn manpower again to actually take the pushes they wanted, especially as they pushed towards Germany itself. It wasn’t a great ratio still, but it’s not like they just magically got worse without reason.
The east also had the absolute majority of axis troops, if it was flipped the other way around the western front would have been just as bloody as the east. Germany had years to dig into fortified positions and got to enjoy the position of defense (well, maybe not enjoyment in the typical sense of the word lol).
So should we compare their relative losses to the Germans when they were on the offensive? Because I promise you, that comparison would not be flattering. The red army absolutely got better, but tactically and operationally it was still by far the worst army in the war, and I am including the Italians in that.
Strategically however, it was excellent at putting men into uniform and having them die for the motherland, which turned out to be very effective, absolutely monstrous, but very effective.
Edit: The red army is the only example in ww2 of an army having a higher casualty rate on the offensive than the defensive, the Germans have a rate of 5:1 (excluding PoWs which included make it 30:1) in France, a similar one while on the offensive until 43, and the Western allies also take fewer casualties than the Germans post D-day
I’m definitely not disagreeing that they performed the worst over the course of the entire war, but the Soviet army of 1945 was actually pretty solid. Their casualty ratio was not bad at all for an offensive army and they made drastic progress. They ended up rather competent when it mattered the most to push with the rest of the Allies.
The early war Soviet methods were ATROCIOUS though.
I'd rather argue that the Germans made a whole laundry list of strategically catastrophic decisions, had trouble filling the ranks from the first months of Barbarossa, had logistics that would make Marshall bald instantly if he saw them, and thus found themselves chronically outnumbered and outgunned.
I think the red army tends to be judged unreasonably favourably simply because it doesn't end the war as the disaster it was initially.
Both can be true though and the truth, like so many other things, is almost guaranteed to be in the middle. I don’t think the Soviets magically became some wonder army at the end, but I do feel it’s undeniable that their own strategies shifted and they saw greater success with less casualties. The average training of their soldiers and officers improved, they embraced successful officers and invited them to conferences to share their knowledge, and they got MUCH better in combined arms warfare and urban warfare. Just across the board late war Soviet battles were fought so differently and to such noticeably better results.
Without the Germans failing so miserably their casualties would have been high, yes, but the late war Soviets had worked their own way up to be a large and competent military force. Not best in the world by ANY measure, but drastically better than where they started. They deserve the praise for improving and the positive impact that probably had on making the East go so smoothly towards the end.
Yea, that I can absolutely agree with. I might be tilting at windmills a bit (Perhaps due to a tankie history teacher in secondary school who more or less claimed Stalin shat gold, and so, red army hagiography really annoys me)
I mean, the difference between a surprise offence against a supposed ally, versus what the Soviets were doing - counter-attacking to reclaim ground that would have been reinforced, in an attack that was expected - isn't an apt comparison. The German army had a big advantage in that their offensive stages were in the early part of the war, when none of the nations were at full preparedness and/or expecting attack, and they were on the defensive for the back nine, where they were at their most prepared, so casualty count isn't the best gauge for success. It was easier, relative, for the Germans to attack unprepared nations in 1939-41, and they were able to make attackers suffer greatly from 1942 onwards, when they were able to prepare defences in North Africa, Italy, Eastern Europe and Western Europe. If you had a choice, you'd want to be attacking a nation that isn't fully mobilised, and you'd want to be defending when you were on favourable terrain and fully mobilised.
Because their tactics early war were god awful, like someone here previously stated. They were wasting manpower to a ridiculous degree at the start, before starting to improve and shift to a more equal exchange. In 41 they were bleeding troops to a ludicrous degree, in 45 they were doing about as well if not slightly better than most theorize an attacking army should perform.
They improved over time by a noticeable margin and the casualties only widened again when they started pushing towards Germany. Even then it was maybe a third as many casualties per German as they had in 41.
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u/simplysufficient88 9d ago edited 9d ago
To be fair, they were on the offensive in 45 and usually the offensive has higher casualties unless they have a truly overwhelming advantage. In 45 the Soviets absolutely had the upper hand, but not nearly to the same level the Allied forces in the West had. They had to burn manpower again to actually take the pushes they wanted, especially as they pushed towards Germany itself. It wasn’t a great ratio still, but it’s not like they just magically got worse without reason.