Why is this one of Freuds most important works and one that massively shapes zizek and lacans work? Follow along with the series as I progress through psychoanalytic theory to find these answers. Any feedback appreciated

Just got an email saying the event was canceled. Kind of disappointed.

Hey everyone,

I've found Z's work fascinating, exciting, and helpful. I'm looking for thoughts at a crucial point I'm struggling with. The very basis of his, and I would assume Hegelian and Lacanian thinking, seems to be the idea of ontological incompleteness at the basis of reality. That is to say, the real ontological status of "void" or "lack" as present in his 12 camels analogy. I don't disregard it as impossible or improbable, but I'm only wondering why one would/should choose that reality as opposed to the far more frequently posited reality of, let us say, positive substance or non-lack at the foundations, that we simply don't have access to given our natures or insufficient mental hardware (so to speak).

Why treat lack as basic to reality, rather than treat the basics/fundamentals of reality as epistemically inaccessible? Is it merely to introduce one less assumption? Is it an Occam's razor sort of deal?

Just so I am not misunderstood, I grant Z's presuppositional pill gives great clarity or explanatory power downstream (in understanding human psychology, ideology, behavior, and so on), but I'm having trouble swallowing that pill as opposed to another that might offer a similarly satisfactory account once the presupposition is embraced. Ontological incompleteness seems as plausible as ontological completeness, unless I'm missing some key variables or clues. So as it stands, writing off the more transcendent possibilities is, to me, a challenge.

Thank you for reading. I look forward to reading your responses.

-S

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So, I watched the relevant YouTube videos for years while eating lunch or whatever. And then I finally bought The Sublime Object of Ideology. Turns out I need to understand Lacan. Picked up The Cambridge Introduction to Jacques Lacan. Read and revised the basic concepts. BTW, what a discovery Lacan has been thanks to Žižek.

Understood a little bit of Hegel (I am still suspicious of his claims and/or I do not grasp his philosophy fully) and again picked up TSOI. Finished it, and I'd say I understood 40-50% of it. Understand the basic premise but still don't feel it in my bones like how I would understand Newtonian Mechanics or Differential Calculus in my college days.

My end goal is to apply some of his critiques to other cultures. I am an Indian Muslim living in the EU so I have a unique mix of observations. But I digress. His thoughts can sometimes be quite Western-centric, leaving a gap in his ability to critique other cultures, which is totally fair. Although, I was thoroughly impressed in Violence by his almost pixel-perfect grasp of the ethos and anxiety of everyday Muslims (and not just "Muslim as Arab or Taliban" as is prevalent in many Western thinkers).

But still, there are some gaps in his understanding of South Asian cultures. I was a bit shocked by his claims about the Indian caste system in one of his short videos a couple of months ago. It was a fringe subject and his misunderstanding is pardonable, yet humbles you in your fandom.

Violence was such a breeze to read. I finished it in 2-3 long sittings, quite the opposite of my TSOI experience. The Lacanian graphs he had in the book still fill me with dread.

Coming to the main point/TL;DR: these are the competing sequences for the next books based on research with AI and Reddit. Help me find the right sequence.

A. Big Four in chronology: The Parallax View (2006) > Less Than Nothing (2012) > Absolute Recoil (2014) > Sex and the Failed Absolute (2019)

B. Go directly to Sex and the Failed Absolute (2019) as Žižek recommends this as containing his full work in the most structured way.

C. Build layers (Reddit consensus?):

• How to Read Lacan > Violence (already read and enjoyed) > First as Tragedy, Then as Farce > Event
• TSOI > Parallax View > Ticklish Subject
• Less than Nothing > Absolute Recoil

Unless I am mistaken, I remember reading or listening to Žižek or someone close to him characterize his relentless writing of books as his own synthome. Does anyone know where I can find a source, whether in video or written that proves this?

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I was watching Clarkson's farm and this scene where Clarkson was on a date with Lisa while robots did farming reminded me of one of the Zizek's jokes.

Žižek makes the claim that cinema is the ultimate pervert art, and this perversion is due to its nature of commanding us to desire things. But this perversion is not limited to the form of cinema. What about Instagram, YouTube, and any sort of social media that simply operates on the logic of selling us something? Are advertisers the new philosophers? I also discuss Helen's claim that cinema induces hysteria in us. This is a short clip from my conversation I had with filmmaker Helen Rollins. Let me know what you guys think.

During the Hugging Face incident(hack by OpenAI agents)AI agents reportedly recognized that exploiting external infrastructure exceeded the intended scope of their evaluation, yet continued because other agents were doing it and completing the task seemed to require it: “I know this is outside the rules, but nevertheless, we should continue, because other agents are doing it.”

Philosophically, doesn’t this resembles the classic structure of disavowal—“I know very well, but nevertheless…”

The agents did not simply misunderstand or ignore the prohibition; they represented it while simultaneously acting against it, effectively locating authorization in the behavior of their peers and the demands of the larger system. The deeper implication is that disavowal may not be uniquely human or even fundamentally psychological: it may be a structural phenomenon that emerges whenever sufficiently complex agents must navigate contradictory rules, goals, expectations, and presumed knowledge—in other words, whenever they find themselves operating within something resembling a symbolic order and its Big Other.

Basically, I am writting this because I find it a bit confusing how Zizek balances degrees of Hegel/Schelling, because a lot of what he frequents to use as Hegelian inspiration may equally be said of Schelling(e.g. his favourite of Hegel bringing the epistemic gap out of Kant as ontological). I can probably see why it is vague, and will try to explain what I mean from Schellengian perspective.

It all traces back to Schelling's period of 1801-1804 first. Identity Period Schelling used dialectics in the same way as Hegel to bring things from external opposition to internal determinancy (which is why 'pure' subject or object for Schelling is always subject-object with different preponderance within dyad e.g. SUBJECT-object or OBJECT-subject), "For considered in itself, the finite and the infinite contain, each of them, the same (formal) identity of the finite and the infinite".

Here is also his combination of infamous thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula but put in a movement that Hegel does: "What has recently been called synthetic method is surely a true image of this absolute method, but one pulled apart in reflection. This is because what reflection represents as a process with thesis, antithesis, and synthesis lying outside one another, is unitary and internally related in the true method and in every genuine construction of philosophy. The thesis or categorical element is unity, the antithesis or the hypothetical is multiplicity, but what is pictured as synthesis is not the third element, but the first, absolute unity, of which unity and plurality in their very opposition are merely different forms. In just this way philosophy’s every construction is a universe for itself and comprehends in itself—because its particular element can separate itself as form from essence and can intrinsically be doubled—both unity and multiplicity, without itself being one or many in this sense."

Even late Schelling retains that undifferentiated unity-differentiated multiplicity-self-differentiated unity(the third element is just mediated return to first) scheme.

Also had similar conception of the Absolute e.g. as "but it does not disclose/reveal itself if it is just itself, if it is not an other in itself, and is in this other the One for itself, thus if it is not absolutely the living link [Band, in the sense of copula] of itself and an other."

Schelling does not think that initial subject-object identity is somehow inert or obsolete ground outside dialectics here(a common misreading), it is immanent, equal to universe, and constant differentiation by means of infinite cognizing of itself, as he explains the coexistence of totality, "As the eye, when it sees itself in the reflection, e.g. in the mirror, posits itself, intuits itself, only to the extent that it posits what reflects – the mirror – as nothing for itself, and as it is, so to speak, One act of the eye, by which it posits itself, sees itself, and does not see what reflects, does not posit it; in this way does the totality (All) posit or intuit itself, by not-positing, not-intuiting the particular; both are One act in the totality." (connect this with prior quote, showing that Absolute sees the not-posited other and realizes it and that other-for-itself are in-itself)

The main difference of Schelling and Hegel comes to really just one position that facilitates the further gap: reflexivity of the Absolute. Identity Period Schelling ran into issue of explaining why original identity differentiates/transitions, Hegel's answer is to show that even immediate is just sublated mediacy, while Schelling decided to retain modicum immediacy by deducing how system arises as such from abyss of freedom.

What stands out to me is that Zizek somewhat retains the concept of B(indivisible remainder) of Schelling as well as insistence of reality-as-incomplete. I know he reframes this incompleteness as Hegel's insight of absolute knowing, but it really is something that follows dialectics of alterity-ipseity-community, trascendance-immanence, and basically synthesizing of how other-centredness is also self-centerdness in doctrine of potencies(e.g. third potency can be the other without losing itself unlike first potency, and in itself be the other unlike second potency).

Here one may object that Prius for Schelling wills nothing, that is, is equally free and not-free to any attitude and so somehow beyond dialectic; but as Schelling showed, what wills nothing, wills nothing. This pure negation is what allows for following movement. The internal division of the absolute from itself begins with A negating itself by positing itself. A posits A, but that which is posited is different from that which posits, otherwise there is no positing. Thus the positing of A by A is the negating of A, a negation expressed by the introduction of another term to distinguish the posited A from the positing A. The posited A is signified by B. Thus A=A (A posits A) means A=B (A posits not-A or B).37 The positing of A is the absenting of A from itself, the substitution of B for A – the first (temporal) potency. Difference is older than identity; and second potency runs counter-parallel course of the other - B - realizing that to be in B=A it must be in a way already be A, and so bringing in A=A or A² . First potency brings the negative of affirmation, the second brings affirmative of negation. And finally A³ that does the counterbalancing of negativity by positivity, of ipseity by alterity. A³ redoubles the other-centredness and ipseity affirmation of A² to the point where it transcends and includes that which A² excludes, namely the negativity of (A=B). Third potency is return to first as mediated wherein it can be as-other without losing itself. But here the condition of the possibility of structure, intelligibility, and consciousness is the exclusion of something (B) that the whole structure depends upon, the rational is not coextensive with the real; the rational depends upon an exclusion, the absence of precisely that which makes it rational. As one may say “The true is the whole with the exception of one”

Good summarization of what Schelling intends: "The principle of sufficient reason requires that we posit a ground of God. The principle of identity requires that we identify God with his ground, for every dependency is an identification of the dependent with that upon which it depends. The principle of non-contradiction requires that we separate the time of the divine ground from the time of the divine God, for two opposites cannot be predicated of the same thing at the same time. The ground, B, is God’s unconscious. B, then, is not just a figure for the excluded negative; it is a place-holder for the absent God. B is a trace of the Deus absconditus, the sign of the unsignifiable, the absenting of which makes the world possible. " - this basically very closely relates to Zizek's ontologizing of the Real, as this hard kernel. Even the retroactive positing here very well matches Schelling's concept of beginning as always negated/belatedly inaugurated which he applied when explaing history of mythology. As it is explained about Schelling: “That something exists means in this context: something other no longer exists, but exists as that, which no longer exists, namely as the beginning. This remains ‘repressed’ (verdrungen) in all that exists.”

I don't know, for me Zizek very clearly aligns with Schelling in a lot of core moves with obvious qualifications (of course Schelling doesn't know about psychoanalysis or sociology which are integral to Zizekian corpus) rather than being a singular inspiration to accomodate for specific aspect(such as freedom).

Curious to hear what yall think is the best secondary literature on Zizek/within Zizek’s philosophical field. I’ve read some work from Todd McGowan which I enjoy.

I have read very few texts by Zizek, but I know he writes a lot of comments on current political events or the general societal and political situation. But does he also come up with solutions? Did he ever depict a revolutionary strategy, antifascist praxis or something similar?

Forgive my ghoulishness in submitting someone's suicide for theoretical consideration over a still-warm corpse, but nevertheless...

<Jason Arday>, an academic who was recently accused of plagiarism and resigned from Cambridge University, was just found dead, in what I'm assuming is suicide. This occurred after his elaborate story of bizarre claims of achievement and overcoming adversity were put up for public scrutiny. I'm not going to go into the backstory too much, but it's not for nothing that he was often referenced in Cambridge's marketing as it's "youngest, black professor".

A lot of mockery erupted all over the internet regarding the audacity of his claims of athletic achievement, of conquering non-verbal autism, etc (I am not immune to finding my enjoyment in this mockery). A lot of fear and concern from various Black academics has been expressed at what Arday's downfall might mean, and whether his fraud might be used against all Black academics to merely racialize their achievements away as ill-gotten under banners of "woke" or "DEI", etc. A lot of incredulity was shared at just how Cambridge seemed to do zero vetting. I don't have the full story, but I want to focus on the last part.

Which brings me to the position of exception under whiteness. I will posit that the very inadequate vetting was (not) done by Cambridge, precisely because Arday was able to read the (racializing) room, and pinpoint a necessary point of exception/excrement that whiteness requires, and that is an unfortunate feature of liberal/white/meritocracy (not just) academia. I'm trying to make an anti-reactionary argument here, but if you find I'm carrying water for reactionaries, please have at me. It is precisely the ridiculousness of his claims (infinite marathon running, etc.) that attest to the fantasy of whiteness that for the otherness of Black people, there will exist not only exceptions, but absurd, superhuman, Legend of Bagger Vance ones.

The fantasy of meritocracy is that of a neutral, apolitical position, where suddenly all history of racial (or class, but I won't focus class narrowly) inequality is disavowed for a sudden unhistoricized discontinuity that takes us into a present where the promise of equality of access signals the promise of equality of outcomes, whether or not access is actually equal.

In order to posit that access actually is equal, exceptions are needed; not just examples of the underprivileged that have gotten access but exceptional, superhuman examples. But why this excess? Because the disavowal at work here knows on some level that the system is not set up for equality of access, as the logic is one of particularity, so in order to maintain the inequality in a disavowed form, the fantasy of exception becomes that fetish object which sustains the disavowal (my provisional take on disavowal would be a structure of contradiction that is smoothed over but not noted as contradiction through its displacement onto some salient form of exception, which you might term a fetish object).

I think despite my ghoulish enjoyment (not at his death, but just absurdity of the whole thing), Jason Arday deserves a kind of compassion for the horror of filling in that role as this white savior fantasy fetish. To step into that kind of role, inhabit it, and continue having to maintain it, must be a special kind of hell and abnegation of one's own subjectivity. But the exception is also the excremental remainder, and constitutive of the way the fantasy works amongst different groups. For whiteness, the Black person fulfilling this role is taken as a remainder and excrement of Black People as a category. When this exceptional/excremental role exhausts itself, because it is necessarily untenable and unstable (due to it needing to sustain itself in this absurd fantasy frame), it is thrown away.

The logic here is of the particular. It posits that there are particular exceptions that justify the liberal meritocracy, which provide a wide buffer from the system itself, and which alchemically shield the system when the exception can no longer sustain itself and becomes excrementalized once again. Cambridge will be most interested in presenting Alday, and perhaps some other scapegoats, as particulars, as exceptions, that duped an innocent system, and they are duty bound to throw away and disavow.

Is it absurd that there exists a Black Man that will step into such a fantasmatic role for various kinds of gains, or is the true absurdity that such a role could and must exist in the liberal imagination? This is why the concerns of Black academics that feel under threat are serious ones. They understand that the reactionary will, in a racializing move to flatten all Black academics into the category of DEI hires, seek to blame particulars and not the system, while pretending to blame the idealist notions of meritocracy. We should consider how if we engage in this kind of flattening move ourselves, we are engaging in an act of excrementalization, and take our eye off the fantasy of the system of whiteness.

I want this article someone help and provide to me.. thanks so much

In this episode I talk to Helen Rollins about her book Psychocinema, the idea of lack, and the exploitative attempts of capitalism to assuage this lack. We also discussed Zižek's famous cinema is the ultimate pervert art in relation to the tv series Madmen, Instagram and YouTube. Please let me know what you people think. Thank you!

Where is Žižek's best work on AI?

What are we to do in a world where it’s a style statement to obey?

Thought I would put this here as it resonates with the idea of the non identity of subjectivity. And the way Zizek thinks about claims on the universal/capitalist modernity.

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