r/AskNetsec • u/GasLongjumping2146 • 12h ago
Concepts Did switching to risk-based vulnerability management (RBVM) actually change your patch cadence, or just your reporting?
Being honest with myself about this one. We rebranded to risk based vulnerability management, RBVM, about a year ago. New scoring, new dashboards, new language in every deck. Looking back, we are patching roughly the same things in roughly the same order we were before. Just with better looking justification attached now.
Which either means our old prioritization was already directionally fine, or it means we relabeled the old model instead of actually building a new one, and I do not know which. For anyone further along than us, did RBVM actually change what gets fixed first and how fast, measurably, or did it mostly just change how the program gets talked about? A real answer please, not the version that goes in a case study.
Same experience here. The rebrand mattered more for audit and vendor conversations than it did for actual patch order. I do not think that is necessarily a failure though, having a defensible answer has real value even without changing outcomes.
For us it did change outcomes, but only because we paired the rebrand with actually ripping out CVSS as the primary sort key. If you keep CVSS as the default sort and just add RBVM language on top, nothing structurally changes.
Patch order actually changed for us once we moved our default queue sort away from raw CVSS toward the risk score built into Nucleus. Lower severity KEV listed findings started jumping ahead of higher severity ones with no exploit. Making that switch is what turned RBVM from a label into an actual behavior change for us.