Я живу в России, на границе с Украиной. И я слышу звуки дрона которые приближается к моему дому.

It is widely known that German mechanized divisions of WW2 were arguably the best out there at the time. Which I do not argue against. But I would say that during Operation Bagration of June to July, 1944 that the 3rd panzer army near Vitebsk, and the Dvina river, and the 4th army/panzer army holding the south and central flanks of Army Group Centre's overextended positions in Belarus and north of the Pripyet marshes Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre by Steven J. Zaloga (Osprey Publishing) outlines operational maps and unit layouts.. The reason it was directed to the South is due to the obvious fact to most people of intermediate knowledge of the Second World War would know that Field Marshal Ernst Von Busch and his relative high command expected an offensive mainly from the south. But my core argument is that Heeresgruppe Mitte had their Panzer's encircled even after exposure to the fact that the Soviets had the majority and their best bet was just to retreat. And avoid the annihilation of Army Group Centre. What are your guys' thoughts on this matter?

I've spent years researching German procurement and supply operations on the Eastern Front and the deeper I got into the data the more convinced I became that logistics failures were just as decisive as any battlefield defeat.

A few things that stand out from my research:

- German fuel reserves were critically insufficient for the scale of Operation Barbarossa from day one

- The Soviet rail gauge difference created a logistical nightmare that was never fully solved

- Ammunition and equipment procurement decisions made in 1939-1940 created shortages that became catastrophic by 1942-1943

- Supply line overextension during the push toward Moscow and Stalingrad left entire Army Groups dangerously exposed

The military history conversation tends to focus on strategy and command decisions — but I'd argue the Wehrmacht was fighting a losing logistical battle long before Stalingrad became the turning point most people recognize.

Curious what this community thinks — could better procurement and supply chain management have meaningfully changed the outcome on the Eastern Front, or were the strategic mistakes too large to overcome regardless?

A great story from a memoir on the Eastern Front! Let me know what yall think! https://youtu.be/dFrbnEhUTn4

If Army Group North and South were used more to protect the flanks of Army Group Center and to contain existing Soviet strongholds (not attack or destroy but to contain). And Army Group North and South were more support groups for Center, Could Center have taken Moscow before November of 1941. What would have happened to the large groups of Soviet military resources around Leningrad and Kiev? Are any simulations available?