r/PhilosophyofScience • u/Exciting_Ad_6837 • 16d ago
Discussion Is the Hidden-variable interpretation never falsifiable?
I'm referring to one of the interpretations of quantum physics. After reading Karl Popper's theory of falsifiability, I'm wondering if the Hidden-variable hypothesis is a pseudo-scientific proposition because no conceivable empirical phenomena seem ever to be able to disprove it.
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u/Techtrekzz 15d ago edited 15d ago
Copenhagen and many worlds are also unfalsifiable, so you might as well just say qm is unfalsifiable.
Empirically the separate interpretations are identical.
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u/Miselfis 15d ago
Empirically the separate interpretations are identical.
This is a common misconception. Most philosophers of physics working in the foundation of quantum mechanics have moved away from the language of “interpretation” because each “interpretation” is a completely different theory with a different mathematical structure and different observable properties. Objective collapse and hidden variable models, for example, violate Lorentz invariance and locality.
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u/ModelSemantics 14d ago
This is quite wrong. Foundational physics still uses the term “interpretation” because it is the correct formal mathematical term, from model theory. The “theory” is quantum mechanics (or what is often more precisely described as nonrelativistic first quantization, for the interpretations discussed) and a “model” of the theory is an assignment of an ontology and statements of truth and existence on which the theory is “interpreted”. In other words, an interpretation is a mapping of a theory onto a class of models that provide an ontology on which to represent truth and existence.
All interpretations of quantum mechanics, from Bohmian to Many Worlds, or Consistent Histories, or operationalist, or relational, etc. give the same isomorphic set of observables.
Now, the theory of standard Bohmian mechanics is nonrelativistic (as I mentioned above) and so the theory itself does not have Lorentz invariance. But, if you look to provide trajectories for a relativistic quantum theory (like the Dirac theory or a full second quantization on a Lorentz metric) you can absolutely do so - and it has the same observable state as the theory it is an interpretation of. This was shown back in the 70s. The observables absolutely are Lorentz invariant. But the ontology includes unobservable things - like space, as Mach famously pointed out long before QM or Einstein. And it has a preferred frame.
But note, this is also true of interpretations of special relativity without any QM weirdness. There are interpretations like LET (Lorentzian Ether Theory) that are completely isomorphic in observable predictions to standard SR interpretations, but which include in their ontology a preferred frame and do not transform space itself under a Lorentz transform.
I say this as someone who has worked with foundational interpretations for over 25 years, it being my focus in my college physics studies and who has attended numerous colloquiums and conferences on the topic. But also, as with all things science, it is eminently verifiable by a scan of the literature.
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u/Miselfis 14d ago edited 13d ago
A physical theory is generally defined in terms of its equation of motion. The different "interpretations" of quantum mechanics have different equations of motion. Very generally, "interpretation" is understood to refer to the different ways in which we can relate a mathematical model to the world we live in.
I'm sure there's a historical explanation for why "interpretation" was used, and how this was term adopted into the field. What I'm talking about is more sociological, an argument often put forward by Sean Carroll. Remember, most working physicists are completely philosophically illiterate. The term "interpretation" signals to a working physicist that the question is philosophy; i.e., something unsettleable, not experimentally live, not something to spend a postdoc on. That signal has consequences, and foundations was for decades a career-limiting field, a good part of the literature ended up in philosophy departments rather than physics, and the standard graduate curriculum still teaches the measurement postulate as a rule to apply rather than a problem to solve. Carroll's point is that the vocabulary contributed to that, because a discipline that files something under "interpretation" has already decided it isn't research. And the field has since gone and made parts of it experimental: collapse models are being constrained right now by macromolecular interferometry and by spontaneous X-ray emission bounds, with parts of the CSL parameter space already excluded.
Carroll's own program takes the Hilbert space and unitary evolution as the entire fundamental ontology and then asks how everything else is recovered: how the factorization into systems gets picked out, how a quasi-classical domain emerges through decoherence, whether spatial locality can be read off the entanglement structure of the state. Those are technical research problems, not just "interpretation". They only make sense as problems if the choice of ontology is an input to doing physics rather than a gloss added afterwards.
Also, in model theory, an interpretation is generally a translation between formal theories, and a model is a structure satisfying a set of sentences. No one working on the different interpretations is checking satisfaction relations and quantum mechanics isn't presented as first-order sentences. It sounds like you're looking for the semantic view of theories, like from Suppes and van Fraassen, on which a theory is a class of models. But structures with different state spaces and dynamical laws are different models on that view, and a "theory" satisfies by both Bohm and Everett is just the observable subalgebra with a certain label, which is the thing in dispute.
Also, on relativistic Bohm theory, there has been a shift since the 70's literature you're referring to. Berndl, Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi showed that there's no Lorentz invariant Bohmian dynamics for several entangled particles with a standard equilibrium distribution. You need a preferred foliation.
Bell called de Broglie-Bohm and GRW rival theories and objected to the surrounding vocabulary himself, Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi present Bohmian mechanics as a theory, Goldstein's phrase for the family is "quantum theories without observers", and Maudlin's textbook opens by denying there's a single quantum theory available to be interpreted. So it's a live terminological dispute among your collegues, and not as clear-cut as you’re framing it.
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u/ModelSemantics 13d ago
I said there was a preferred frame, and then you “correct” me by talking about the result that established that foliation? I even gave the literature response on why it doesn’t matter… in the post you responded to.
As to the history of the term “interpretation”, it comes from Tarski and mathematics. Model theory is the foundation of modern metamathematical studies on mathematical foundations and is carried in to the foundations of formal languages and computer science. It is the structure to our modern technical view of semantics, or how we find the meaning of statements, and is a critical step in building any operationalizable science.
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u/fox-mcleod 15d ago
I love that you got downvoted for an objectively correct accounting of the current discourse.
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u/GoldenMuscleGod 13d ago edited 13d ago
I want to make sure I understand what you mean by this.
Suppose I hypothesize a completely separate universe with different laws (or the same I guess) that is causally isolated from ours. In my theory both our universe and that other one exist.
Someone else has an identical theory except only for our universe. The other one doesn’t exist.
Are these two theories “empirically identical”?
Now take this “interpretation” (or not) of special relativity: there is one objective frame of reference in which all laws of nature hold. Anyone who is moving can apply those laws assuming they are not moving and get consistent results because the laws happen to be Lorentz invariant, but they are wrong. The lengths they measure and call the “rest length” are longer than they should be because they just aren’t using their instruments right. Are these two theories (this and the standard account of relativity, where everyone is “right”) “empirically identical”?
I *think* you will say the first pair are not and the second pair are. But I am not sure. I think most physicists would say they are both “empirically identical” in the sense they mean.
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u/Miselfis 13d ago
Depends what you mean by "empirically identical". Since we only have access to our universe, a theory that has our universe and another is empirically identical to a theory that just has our universe. To choose between them, we use the principle behind Occam's Razor. To accept the version that also posits the other universe, you'd need some justification as to why that other universe should be there.
I'm not sure I understand your second example. You provided a single interpretation, and asked me if it's empirically identical, but you didn't provide the second referent.
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u/GoldenMuscleGod 13d ago
I understood you had an idea of “empirically identical” from your comment I replied to, is it just the word “interpretation” you were taking issue with (that these are two different theories rather than two interpretations of one theory)? If so then my question would be whether the two things in the pairs are the “same theory.” You were saying, for example, many-worlds and Copenhagen are different in some sense that is more than interpretation, I am asking if these pairs are different in that same sense.
For special relativity. The difference is whether we think simultaneity is “actually” relative rather than just “seeming” relative to one observer when in reality (in some mysterious ontological sense) everything happens in an actual order of time. Mathematically you can imagine we do this by structuring the theory to have special terms for the coordinates in one frame of reference but the other coordinate systems only being referred to as non-primitive defined notions.
I guess what I’m trying to get at is how to make the distinction you are talking about rigorous. For example, mathematically, If two theories are bi-interpretable but have different ontologies (make this rigorous by saying that if we have a model of one theory we cannot convert it to a model of the other just by translating the languages signature according to the interpretation) are they “the same” in this sense you have in mind or “different”? (I don’t know if that’s too much mathematical jargon if it is then just focusing on the concrete examples I gave would help me understand what you mean)
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u/Miselfis 12d ago
If the structural content is different, they are different theories. That’s it.
If you have a version of relativity that has a different mathematical structure that’s not isomorphic or equivalent to the standard theory, then it is a different theory and not just a new interpretation.
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u/GoldenMuscleGod 12d ago
I’m not sure what you mean by “structural content.”
I might be overly literal (and taking terms mathematically), but “isomorphic” is usually a feature of structures/models, not of theories - I don’t know what you mean by “isomorphic” - “bi-interpretable” is the first thing I would guess.
“Equivalent” is more applicable but not perfectly clear: if we mean “logically equivalent” as in “they have the same entailments within their (apparently shared) language” then we would usually say the theories have the same identity, because a theory is the set of its logical consequences within its own language. But I think you might mean “equivalent” in some other sense, like they have the same phenomenological predictions, for example.
The key point I wanted to investigate is: do Copenhagen and many-worlds have any phenomenological differences in their predictions (aside from whether we attribute phenomenological things to noninteracting parts of a the wave-function - that’s like the “second universe” hypothesis I gave) such that an observer in a many-worlds universe could ever gain evidence for or against the Copenhagen interpretation. My understanding is “no” and I cannot tell whether you are saying it is “yes” or instead arguing the theories are different for other reasons, like that a hidden variables theory is different solely by virtue of admitting hidden variables into the formalism.
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u/Exciting_Ad_6837 15d ago
When the hidden variable is finally found and everything can be predicted deterministically a la Newtonian physics, the Copenhagen interpretation will be falsified once and for all.
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u/Mooks79 15d ago
If.
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u/Exciting_Ad_6837 15d ago
Then it's falsifiable.
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u/Mooks79 15d ago edited 15d ago
Not if Bell’s Theorem holds as it’ll never be found (and can’t be found - at least local ones). Though there are interpretations that are equivalent to locally real hidden variables (arguably), but the models are still fundamentally stochastic. As far as I’m aware, there are no local, real, and deterministic interpretations. Something always has to give.
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u/Underhill42 15d ago
With locality being the obvious one to give.
Bell showed that entanglement appears to genuinely behave as a nonlocal phenomena.
Trying to explain a nonlocal phenomena using only local mechanisms seems like an exercise in futility.
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u/Mooks79 15d ago
I’d argue an Everettian explanation is both real, local and - sort of - deterministic. But I also hope someone one day proves Bell’s Theroem either wrong (eg incorrect prior) or irrelevant (as does Barandes’), but without other weirdness. I tend to be with Einstein on this, I hope for a real, deterministic, local model that is waiting for the right idea/mathematics. I could well be wrong, I’m probably wrong, but it’s what I hope for.
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u/Miselfis 15d ago
Everettian seems the most natural. As Einstein thought as well, the most parsimonious theory is usually the right one. I think Einstein would have liked Everettian QM had he been alive today, exactly because is deterministic, it’s local, and it’s real, and it doesn’t rely on any unobservable assumptions to make it conform to our intuition (like the ether).
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u/Mooks79 14d ago
This is roughly my position. I don’t like some aspects of the Everettian interpretation but it is the one that takes the wavefunction at face value and doesn’t posit additional phenomena. As I see no strong reason to add these additional phenomena, given our current state of knowledge, I’m left with Everett’s interpretation as my default position.
I am sympathetic to Barandes’ formulation for similar reasons - because it also appears to add nothing but the essentials, indeed, it removes some assumptions from the statistics so it’s arguably more “pure” than even Everett’s. If it had come first I might consider it the default position. But I’m still left having to accept something I don’t like - that the universe is fundamentally probabilistic (and processes are indivisible seems a bit weird, too).
I still hopefully suspect it’s all a problem waiting for the right mathematics, though.
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u/HamiltonBrae 14d ago
I wouldn't call postulating many branching universes parsimonious. Neither am I convinced Many Worlds can be considered truly local.
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u/Miselfis 14d ago
No one is postulating any branching universes. That is the consequence, not the input. Many Worlds just takes the unitary formalism at face value. It’s all the other approaches that have to find ways to get rid of the unobserved worlds post measurement. Every approach needs those other worlds before measurement in order to explain what we see in experiments.
Quantum mechanics formalism is entirely local. I don’t understand how you can be not convinced of this, granted you understand how quantum mechanics works.
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u/fox-mcleod 15d ago
Copenhagen is but many worlds would be very easy to falsify. Just do any test that disagrees with the Schrödinger equation. Many Worlds is simply the assertion that the Schrödinger equation holds without modification (like collapse).
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u/AchillesSinatra 15d ago edited 15d ago
For whatever it's worth -- although I notice another commenter (PoxonAllHoaxes) below hints at the same -- my own view is that all this talk of falsification and falsifiability is just another deeply entrenched myth, one that we'd be better to recognize, and do away with. Philosophers of science and philosophically inclined scientists (I can even quote you Einstein, ahead of his time, saying the same) have long known this, though a great many scientists continue to perpetuate the myth.
You might google the "Duhem-Quine thesis" if you want to learn more, or google a Scientific American article entitled "The Idea that a Scientific Theory Can be Falsified is a Myth" for a lightweight introduction. The problem, though, is essentially very simple and common-sensical: In any situation where theoretical predictions appear to be at odds with the observed facts, there's always something you can say (besides "the theory is false"). Scientists (nor anyone else) are never compelled by logic to the conclusion that a theory is false.
For example, if the predictions of Newtonian theory are at odds with planetary motion (e.g. Uranus, Mercury), rather than being compelled to conclude that the theory is false, you can always say "There must be something else out there (e.g. an unknown planet) responsible for the fact-theory mismatch." If distant galaxies are behaving in a manner at odds with GR predictions, you can always say something similar (e.g. dark matter is responsible). Ditto for any other theory. My examples, needless to say, are precisely what happened as a matter of historical fact.
Does that mean scientists, either individually or collectively, can't come to believe that a theory is false? They can't have good reasons for thinking a theory is false? Of course not. What it means is that they cannot logically demonstrate that a theory is false -- which is precisely the quality which supposedly demarcates scientific claims from the claims of pseudoscience, religion, metaphysics, etc. (the second element of the myth).
For your reference, here's Steven Weinberg saying the same thing. Read "absolutely ruled out" as "definitively falsified."
"Pierre Duhem and W. Van Orman Quine pointed out long ago that a scientific theory can never be absolutely ruled out by experimental data because there is always some way of manipulating the theory or the auxiliary assumptions to create an agreement between theory and experiment."
- "Dreams of a Final Theory", p125
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u/fox-mcleod 15d ago
The term for that idea is “naive falsification” and it wasn’t what Popper was teaching.
Popper already understood and in fact taught that all explanations are theory-laden. The entire reason it’s called fallibalism is that rejection of theories as having been falsified is also a theory. Which could in theory also be falsified.
It’s a common misconception to try and treat fallibalism as a form of psuedo-inductivism or empiricism in which “logic” or “experiment” proves a proposition false from some absolute perspective. Instead, whether a given theory actually is false is logically determined by evaluating the premises of the theory in total. And moves to try and bolster a theory which has been falsified with post-hoc variation is the explicit hallmark of a bad explanation (rather than an unscientific one). Bad explanations are rigorously defined as ones which are easy to vary.
Science and “scientific” do not apply to individual theories but rather to the process of rejecting (or not) falsified conjecture.
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u/BerkeleyYears 15d ago
in fact the demarcation principle can be understood as making the advocate of the theory specify specifically what will disprove it. in that sense, falsification is the responsibility of the one making the claim not the one that tires to refute it. if you can't specify what will falsify your theory, its in the realm of pseudoscience. of course, real world science is more complex as humans are, but this is more of aspirational motivation and guiding principle then a hard rule to follow.
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u/AchillesSinatra 15d ago
"The term for that idea is “naive falsification” and it wasn’t what Popper was teaching."
I'm aware of that. It is, however, what confused scientists and science educators typically teach, you know the kind of thing, one pre-Cambrian rabbit and ding-dong the theory is dead.
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u/BerkeleyYears 15d ago
you might be aware of that but you did not mention that its a misunderstanding of Poppers theory and one which he clearly argued against.
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u/AchillesSinatra 14d ago
The impression I got is that the thread creator is new to the philosophy of science (since he has only recently become acquainted with Karl Popper), he labors under the misapprehension that some Popperian-type demarcation criterion is already actively in service in science, and he fears that one particular interpretation of QM may fail to satisfy that criterion.
I explained, therefore, why he may be laboring under certain misapprehensions, just as I see other commenters doing. Despite what scientists themselves frequently say about these things, there is no such demarcation criterion on active duty. If I've grabbed the wrong end of the stick, the OP is advised to disregard my comment with my apologies.
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u/Advertising-Budget 13d ago
Except it still is. Just because falsification isn't true doesn't mean making falsifiable risky testable predictions is not still the criteria of saving theories that are proven to not be true. Falsification hasn't gone anywhere pragmatically.
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u/Aescorvo 14d ago
OP will move on to Lakatos’ Research Programmes soon enough, and all will be well again!
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u/FrontAd9873 15d ago
In a sane world anyone commenting on the philosophy of science sub would already know about the Duhem-Quine Thesis since it is something you learn in like week 2 of a 101 course.
But this is a well-written comment for the actual world we do live in!
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u/spatling 15d ago
Putting aside whether falsifiability is the be-all-and-end-all yardstick for good science, I think many would agree that interpretations of QM fall into the remit of Philosophy rather than straight Science, insofar as they aim to make identical predictions about reality but differ in their underlying metaphysics.
That said, local hidden variable interpretations have pretty much been disproved (Bell’s Theorem, one of the coolest proofs ever imo) - what’s left is non-local hidden variable theories, which maybe seem less compelling. Maybe if it’s been disproved once it can be disproved again…?
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u/Mooks79 15d ago edited 15d ago
Sean Carroll would disagree. His view is that interpretation is as much a part of science as is prediction.
Edit: oh and Jacob Barandes’ interpretation gets around Bell’s Theorem to make a causally local, but to do so you have to accept indivisible stochastic processes, which are arguably equivalent to hidden variables, so it’s not without its own “weirdness”.
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u/Euphoric-Air6801 15d ago
You can also save local realism by adopting superdeterminism. 😏
(... but both superdeterminism and indivisible stochastic processes feel like cutting off your metaphysical nose in order to spite your epistemological face. 👃🏽✂️ )
Come to the Bohmian side of the triad ... we don't have local realism, but we do have global realism ... and cookies! 🍪🤪
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u/Mooks79 15d ago
You can. I think the point is that, with our current state of knowledge (ie unless someone has some revelatory idea / new mathematics that changes something we thought fundamentally impossible to change) then whatever interpretation you look at has to “give up” something. Then it almost becomes a personal decision as to what you feel more comfortable relinquishing. For me, local realism is absolutely not one of those things!
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u/Euphoric-Air6801 15d ago
Well, unfortunately, "local realism" is an oxymoron. (Bell's Theorem) You literally cannot have local realism without an equivalent of superdeterminism. And, specifically, you can have localism or realism but not both. (Copenhagen interpretations keep localism at the cost of realism. Bohmian interpretations keep realism at the cost of localism. Superdeterministic interpretations keep local realism at the cost of, well, swallowing superdeterminism. 🤷♂️🤪)
So ... are you sure you don't want one of these tasty Bohmian cookies? They're globally delicious! 🌐🍪
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u/Mooks79 15d ago
Only if Bell’s theorem is correct. But that’s why I don’t like any of the current interpretations. I’m probably most sympathetic to Everett’s which seems to give up the least, albeit not without its own weirdness. But I appreciate its sort of mathematical purity.
If Bohmian mechanics can make the same range of cookies that quantum mechanics can make, instead of a few very specific/simple ones, then I might reappraise it. Until now it’s just an idea that doesn’t explain too much and gives up something I don’t want to give up. I’d certainly sooner accept super determinism than Bohmian mechanics as it stands.
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u/Euphoric-Air6801 15d ago
Ah. Interesting. I had mistakenly thought that you were advocating for one of the Copenhagen versions. I see now what you meant: you're not trying to have your local cake and realism, too ... you actually do personally prefer the superdeterministic interpretations. 🤔
Well ... fair enough! 🤷♂️🤪 Those are certainly equally valid, I just don't personally prefer them. But, yeah, if you are comfortable adopting superdeterminism, then you really can keep local realism. (The rest of us will just keep looking at you strangely as you keep behaving as if you believe that you are making choices and such ... 🤪) Do you have cookies? 😁
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u/Mooks79 15d ago
No I do not prefer Copenhagen. Although I do hypocritically have a soft spot for QBism! I don’t think it’s right but I like the concept of the wave function being a state of knowledge. I would not say I prefer super determinism in general, I said I prefer super determinism to Bohmian mechanics. But that’s like choosing which STI you prefer, to me. I would like a local realist interpretation and, currently, Everettian mechanics is closest to that. But I hope someone comes up with something that sorts it all out and shows Bell’s Theorem is misguided / makes a wrong prior distribution or something.
People will look at me strangely is a bold statement for someone who believes in pilot waves …
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u/Euphoric-Air6801 15d ago
Those pilot waves are what allow for remote viewing, among other wonders. You discount them at your own loss, but it doesn't bother me. 🤷♂️🤪
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u/PoxonAllHoaxes 15d ago
As Popper actually admitted in print (but you have to read his book carefully), his definition of falsifiabilty itself fails absolutely to define what is "scientific" because as he says any scientist who wants to can perfectly logically reject any given proposed falsification of his theory.
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u/mhb2 15d ago
There are two things to keep separate here:
- Can hidden-variable theories be empirically falsified? If your hidden-variable theory is local and makes the Bell assumptions, experiment has ruled it out. Aspect, Clauser, and Zeilinger got the 2022 Nobel prize in physics for those experiments.
- Can there be some hidden-variable interpretation that reproduces quantum predictions? Yes, Bohmian mechanics does this at the cost of abandoning locality so it's not experimentally distinguishable from ordinary QM. Bell himself was an advocate of taking Bohmian mechanics seriously.
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u/Wobama46 15d ago
The issue with Bohmian mechanics is that there has yet to be a successful implementation of Bohmian mechanics towards relativistic QFT. That's the biggest hurdling block right now.
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u/Miselfis 15d ago
Experiment has already disproven such theories. That’s what the recent Nobel Prize was awarded for.
Hidden-variable theories require nonlocality to reproduce the experimental data, and nonlocality is unphysical. Accepting hidden variables would mean tossing out the Standard Model and relativity; the two pillars that are arguably the most thoroughly confirmed theories in scientific history.
In other words, you’d have to discard some of our best-established scientific theories in order to accommodate hidden variables. The justification for demanding hidden variables therefore needs to be extremely strong if that’s going to be a worthwhile scientific trade-off.
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u/fox-mcleod 15d ago
Hidden variable theories were broadly falsified by Bell tests.
The problem is that people then went back and reworked them to be non-local and ill-defined non-locality renders them (and most theories) unfalsifiable.
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u/MonsterkillWow 15d ago
Local realism is disproved by Bell's inequalities being violated. As for weaker versions of realism or locality, there are a lot of allowable philosophical interpretations.
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u/Vegetable-Age5536 15d ago
Bohemian mechanics is a hidden variable theory that potentially can be empirically falsifiable through arrival times. Something that standard QM cannot calculate nor do. So no, it is not unfalsifiable.
Another note, Popper’s criterion is garbage. Check out “the demise of the demarcation problem” by Laudan, and you will see it does not make any sense to try to establish science in such a naive way (or any way whatsoever).
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u/Messier_Mystic 15d ago
Late to the party, but Popperian falsificationism ultimately undoes itself, and that's been the case since the 1930s. Beyond that point, this issue isn't limited to hidden variables in certain interpretations of QM. "Only verifiable statements are meaningful" is itself not empirically verifiable.
There are plenty of posited unobservable-in-principle quantities under certain interpretations. The electromagnetic potential's absolute gauge, the interior structure of black holes, whether a given electron went through slit A or B in orthodox QM. Physics is loaded with this stuff.
Them's the breaks. For the time being.
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u/In_the_year_3535 15d ago
Hidden variables is a pejorative way to diminish the complexity of calculations. It is easier, computationally, to assume qualities are inherent to the particle than to show environmentally how they arise.
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