One thing I noticed about the 19th century American Army is that it was pretty small, and that the Army was often demobbed back to a small size after large conflicts such as the ACW. However, this was counterbalanced by the United States having a strong officer corps, to the point where European observers often complemented American leaders during the ACW.

Given this quality, would it be fair to assume that the major American officer academies at the time like West Point offered a quality of training similar to the European great powers, and if so, when and how did West Point catch up given the lack of peer opponents that the USA faced and American lack of experience?

In modern times during marathons over a single day horse usually beats man except in some exceptional cases, I am not sure about longer marching distances.

Additional questions:

1. What would be the explanation for whatever your answer is?

2. What would be the approximate length covered for varying durations of marches from short to long for both types of armies?

3. Has an mixed infantry heavy army ever caught an horse cavalry heavy force by surprise assuming it is true?

4. What would be the stats for an nomadic cavalry army assuming it is different from normal cavalry?

5. Do the stats change depending on number of horses available to the cavalryman at what number can the original answer change assuming it changes?

A topic of debate that's stayed around at a low level since the very earliest days of military discussion on the internet. How useful actually was defensive arnament on bombers in WW2 and how much was the right amount?

Most people seem to fall into one of two camps:

1. Bomber defensive armament was useless. Heavy bombers should have been optimized for speed against all else as defensive armament was ineffective at reducing losses when fighter escort wasn't present, and so it shouldn't have been used at all or at most just a tail gun.. Usual evidence presented is the Mosquito's low loss rates and smaller crew compared to strategic bombers.
2. Bomber defensive armament should be as extensive as possible while still allowing a bomb load to be carried. The main argument for this is that a heavy bomber stripped of defensive armament wouldn't actually be much faster, and it would have required a largely clean sheet design to take advantage of any potential speed gain. The main examples for this camp are the B-17 and B-24.

A few people seem to think that bombers should have had defensive armament, but not as much as the American bombers did given than their British counterparts in similar size catagories (Excluding the B-29, but the B-29 only ever flew over Japan which never had as effective an IADs as Germany did). This seems to be a far rarer position that people on the extreme ends though.

What's the userbase of r/WarColleges opinions on the effectiveness of world war two defensive armament on WW2 mediums and heavies?

While we aren't 100% certain how hoplites fought, we do know that they were heavy infantry. Fought with a fairly large shield, and armour along with spears and swords.

But a military campaign is not strictly pitched battles or sieges. While Ancient Greek armies had dedicated light skirmishers, do we know if Greek hoplites switched equipment during campaigns? Would a hoplite have gone out to skirmish using light equipment between battles?

I ask because the myths and stories from Ancient Greece give me the impression that skills like archery were valued. Which would be more associated with skirmishing.

I know the basics, but after thinking about it, it seems hard to do, unless it’s a river and you blow up the bridge or something like, cant the enemy just go around? How do the tactics for it work?

thanks

Thinking about anti-UAV stuff, and it occured to me that a fly-by-wire aircraft with decent sensors is only software away from being able to aim its fixed gun by itself. Has there ever been a plane that does that, or its lighter sibling of timing shots?

Not really thinking about dramatic motions, more "last degree" aiming assistance.

Given all the fun they can put in a 25mm round these days, what's standing in the way of "one round one drone" performance by a manned fighter? Leaving aside the question of if they have better things to do than drone hunting.

[amateur noob here]

I've seen the use of CIWS on naval vessels for some time, for use against fast moving targets, usually high rate of fire Gatling type guns flooding an area with rounds.

Most anti-air systems moved towards missiles over time, the use of high ROF guns for AA falling away. We did have units like the Tunguska which utilised guns, but I'm wondering whether an armoured unit like this with guns as an anti-drone machine would make any sense?

A high ROF, quick turrets, ability to flood an area with rounds, would be a decent defence? I'm talking more about the small/medium drones, rather than the larger, long range ones. The existing defences for those seem to work ok (if you have the missiles available).

Is the issue more to do with the difficulty of detecting and tracking the small drones? So what you then fire at the drone is the easy part (although it also seems to me that a shitload of tiny missiles that are dirt cheap are needed rather than spending $250k to shoot down a tiny $100 drone), it's more about the challenge of being able to effectively detect and track them due to their tiny radar signatures?

I was reading through this paper, The survival of the Chinese handgun in the late Ming, c. 1550–1644, and was quite astounded by the ranges various Ming leaders gave for arquebusiers usually around 300-500 meters. There is also an instance where the Ming leaders praised the Ottoman designs for their superior range and accuracy compared to the Japanese guns during the Imjin War, and from the accounts it seems in agreement that the Japanese gunners had superior accuracy and range during the engagements.

In a late 16th century while writing a playbook asserting the superior range of early firearms, Barnabe Rich gives these numbers:

I dare undertake that if one hundred of those thousande [archers] doo shoote above ten score [200], that ii hundred of the rest, wyll shoote shorte of ix score [180], and is not this a piece of advantage thinkest thou ? when every Calyver that is brought into the feelde wyl carry a shot xviii score [360] and xx score [400], and every Musquet xxiiii [480] and xxx score [600].

I'm not exactly sure what pace measurement he's using, but even when using the wiki standard of a pace measurement in feet or meters (it was 5 feet, 1.5 meters per pace) they're still ridiculously long ranged for smoothbore weapons.

This seems to be a wild far cry from later engagement ranges in the Napoleonic wars which seem to occur in the 100-300 yard (~90-270) range. Of course, the ranges listed may very well be talking about hitting formation sized targets, but many also assert the superior accuracy and range at hitting individual targets as well and doesn't really explain why nobody decided to open up volleys at farther ranges during the Napoleonic wars. Or I'm just reading the sources entirely wrong and they're just talking about maximum ranges?

Basically, did overall firearm engagement distances actually decrease during the time period? If so, why did that happen given the improvements to firearm technology?

In recent years, affordability in weapons, particularly PGMs and air defense among other things has been a major topic. Among the major powers, how have they gone about pursuing affordability in military hardware? The Iranian Shahed-style drones have spawned multiple copies or similar designs in other countries to fulfill the niche it serves while lately, Russia has seen breakthroughs in jet-powered OWAs and cheaper cruise missiles that likely stem from the influx of Chinese micro-engines entering mass production. The Ukrainian scaling up of drone warfare since 2022 has sparked a military revolution among both state and non-state forces into setting up their own DIY drone program. Countering OWAs has spawned cheaper interceptor drones first by Ukraine before other countries began fielding their own.

I've recently started looking into early rangefinding technology and am having trouble finding any information on the distance at which optical rangefinders were used and what would determine the maximum range of a coincidence / stereoscopic rangefinder.

Obviously a bigger rangefinder like what you'd see on a ship would be usable for ranging further away targets than you could with a man-portable rangefinder, but how does the size dictate this maximum range and are there any examples of optical rangefinder ranges? The best I can think of is the vague figure of 5000 yards given in a Chieftain video.

Of course it tied those nations to NATO and to the US in particular but from a strategic perspective for the nations, did sending hundreds/thousands of troops to warzones in Afghanistan help professionalize their armed forces after the fall of communism?

During the Cold War, there was a significant British and American focus on countering Soviet submarines trying to enter the Atlantic. Later in the Cold War, there was this idea of pushing into the High North from NATO and dealing with Soviet submarines more offensively.

The UK and USA built several classes of nuclear submarines, and also several classes of anti-submarine frigates. Were both submarines and frigates used to actively hunt Soviet submarines, or were the frigates expected to act more defensively, allowing the submarines to come to them, and then attempt to sink them?

I'm wondering this because recently, I've seen people talk about the modern frigate being degraded significantly by modern submarines. Was this the same during the Cold War? Were frigates really just passive assets, rather than active submarine hunters?

I've been rereading Pride and Fall: The British Army in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 by Sergio Miller, and one of the bits that stood out to me was his mention that in 2005-2007 British units (at the company level) would simply refuse to patrol certain routes/undertake certain missions.

The reasons cited varied: a lack of CASEVAC availiability, too many IEDs/bad mine clearing equipment. "what's the point in clearing this route, it doesn't achieve anything" etc

Nothing I've read indicates that units were punished for refusing these low-level missions, but Miller notes that it was a major problem in Helmand WRT ISAFs mission.

How did British officers work around these refusals? Find another unit that would do it? rework plans/timelines as and when solutions to specific issues appeared?

Edit: I don't mean "Respectfully Sir, this mission is silly" I mean that the riflemen are literally refusing to leave their FOB to do a daily patrol. I know there are similar reports from Vietnam from units that refused to go "outside of the wire" etc, so this is just a general question, not specifically aimed at the UK's experience in Afghanistan

I am looking for book and article recommendations that describe the U.S. role in the fighting and 2024 resolution of the civil war in Syria. Thanks in advance.

I've been interested in delving into research on military strategy as a curiosity. Been dabbling in TT war games, RTS, and etc. But I'm new to the topic of modern warfare and strategies.

Many posts and other research has brought me to WWI and WWII books which are great. I also want to learn more about the development of war as technology has advanced.

My only exposure to naval crew organization has been through shows like Star Trek or Star Wars, where command functions have been greatly simplified to the point where a ship can be commanded almost entirely by a handful of people in a room. Even realistic-ish shows like Battlestar Galactica do this to an extent in their command centers. How would your typical crew on an American Arleigh-Burke class destroyer (or a Nimitz class carrier) be organized in comparison? (an additional explanation on the American naval officer ranking system would also be appreciated)

Preferably ones that aren't mostly just biographies of stilwell/wingate/etc and focus on things like where the supply lines were, what were the major operations mounted, and so on?

It seems that the British and French spent a goodly part of the 18th century (and before) at war with each other...

Yet most accounts show that language was always a problem. Despite this multi-generational conflict did neither country really make any effort to teach the others language?

I get that regular grunts you put through boot camp and then they're basically soldiers that you can put into units and then you put them into a reserve and call them up when you need them

but how about officers? I assume it takes a while to train those but you probably also need a bunch to have in your regular standing army and then also some in case those die ready to go, and that's not even counting all the other officers you need for different stuff that's not directly leading soldiers in combat, I presume you don't just got like a ton of officers in reserve that you can call up? Or maybe they do I don't know

So yeah who and how do they decide how many officers an army has? I'm thinking mainly US here but if anybody has insight into other armies that could be great too

It would also be good to learn in which cases or what would be the arguments against this condition. For eg, the superior officer does not like this, they would rather the cargo was moved at a safe time or had taken a different route.

Theres a lot of talk about Germany’s military advancements in ground and aerial equipment (and somewhat less deservedly in naval ships like the Bismarck) but in comparison the Japanese Empire, despite having the world’s third largest navy, is often neglected in discussion. Whenever their technology is brought up it’s often to describe how behind they were from the Allies in fire control systems, cryptography, tanks, small arms, etc. This depiction has penetrated public consciousness to the point where in the Man In The High Castle tv series the Japanese Empire is portrayed as far behind the Germans, even going so far as to say they dont have nuclear weaponry despite a 20 year timeskip.

Despite being a pioneer in mechanized warfare, the Germans in WW2 were still heavily reliant on horses for their logistics. Compared to dealing with attrition to personnel, what can be said about the topic when it comes to animals once modern warfare came around 19th century onward? In WW2, what was the situation regarding that for the nations that still depended on animals for logistics?

It would appear from the photographs I've seen that the original WWII-era mounts were all exposed; they began to be covered at some point the Cold War period, but by the end of their service life in the '80s and '90s a lot of them were uncovered again. I am wondering:

1. Why would the gun shield be removed/never installed? Was it a matter of expense, mechanical reliability, or ease of access to the gun for maintenance?

2. Was it purely meant for protection against the weather, or did it provide any minimal armoured function against shrapnel/small arms fire?

3. Am I right in saying that there were two small windows on either side? How well could the crew see out of these? Are there any other examples of gun shields/turrets with windows?