Yes, literally morally wrong.
I am not saying that donating is just a commendable practice, or that reducing animal products makes you a little bit of a better person.
My view is that if you face no serious financial hardships, health limitations, or equally important obligations, and you can make these sacrifices at little cost yet refuse to do so, you are doing something morally wrong.
These are the two things I believe are morally required for the financially comfortable:
- Donate some reasonable portion of their income to effective causes
- Reduce their consumption of animal products, particularly those produced through intensive animal agriculture or factory farming
To clarify my position, I am NOT arguing you must donate everything you possibly can, nor am I arguing that everyone must become vegan.
I am also not arguing that morality requires you to maximize total welfare as much as possible every second of your life.
I am arguing there is definitely a moral minimum above zero, and a big reason why this doesn't feel obvious to many people is because modern society makes the suffering caused or preventable by our choices extremely easy to keep out of your mind.
Here is the principle behind my view:
If you can prevent or substantially reduce serious suffering at relatively little cost to yourself, and you have the means to do it, and doing so does not require sacrificing something of comparable importance, then completely refusing to help is morally wrong.
Again, to clarify my position, I am not saying that if one action produces more welfare than another action then choosing the lesser one is immoral. I reject that.
Suppose one person donates $1000 and another donates $1100. The first person did not do something wrong just because another $100 could have produced more good.
My claim is that there is some minimum level below which your refusal to make even a small sacrifice becomes morally wrong.
I am not claiming to know where this threshold lies, but moral concepts can have fuzzy boundaries while still containing obvious cases. There is no precise number of hairs on your head at which you become bald, however, that does not mean that baldness does not exist.
Likewise, I don't think we need to calculate the exact percent of someone's income at which they are no longer morally wrong for not donating to believe that 0% is clearly too little for someone with substantial disposable income.
Donation
Consider a thought experiment:
Every morning on your way to work, you walk past a child with malaria
Suppose that you know with certainty that handing over $7 will save the child's life
You have $80,000 in your pocket every morning on the walk
You walk past, and the child dies
The next morning, there is another child with malaria, and $7 would save them.
You walk past
Another child the following morning
You keep your $7
You continue to do this day after day
I think almost everyone would stop describing your behavior as just "It would have been nicer if you helped."
Almost everyone would agree there is something seriously morally wrong with repeatedly allowing children to die in order to maintain a trivial amount of money.
Now change one fact:
Instead of the child being ten feet away, the child is 5,000 miles away, and instead of physically handing the child $7, you can do so at the press of a button on your phone.
Why does that change the child's moral value?
Of course, the real world is more complicated than the thought experiment. $7 does not reliably save one child. Here are the actual numbers:
UNICEF estimates that 4.9 million children died before reaching age five in 2024, and says that most of these deaths are preventable through proven, relatively low-cost interventions and access to quality healthcare (UNICEF)
GiveWell estimates that roughly $7 can provide a child with a full course of preventative malaria medication through a malaria season. Its models for its top charities during 2022-2024 estimate around $3500-5500 per life saved on average, though it can vary heavily on a case-by-case basis and is not a guarantee (GiveWell)
Another thought experiment:
Consider someone making $80,000 who is financially secure.
They spend hundreds or thousands of dollars each year on things like:
restaurants, subscriptions, new electronics, alcohol, vacations, unused clothes, upgrades for items that already work, dozens of other marginal luxuries
I am not saying that enjoying these things is immoral, however, if that person were to tell me that giving even 1% of their income (which would be $67 per month) is something morality has no right to ask of them, I find that extraordinarily difficult to defend.
We're comparing small improvements in the lifestyle of someone who is already comfortable against interventions for malaria, childhood disease, malnutrition, and extreme poverty.
Again, I find it extremely hard to defend that preserving every dollar of consumption outweighs the expected benefit produced by even a modest donation.
"If that's true, why don't I have to donate everything?"
This is the most obvious objection, and I don't think it defeats my position.
I am not claiming whenever $1 benefits someone more than it benefits you, you must give it away. That would require giving until you're severely impoverished, since there is always someone who could benefit from money more than you could, and your flourishing has moral weight too.
My claim concerns situations where the cost to you is small relative to the suffering you can expect it to reduce. You are certainly permitted morally to save for retirement, provide for your children, help your parents, have hobbies, travel, and build a life you want to live. However, "my life matters too" does not imply "therefore every additional dollar I could spend on myself matters enough to justify giving literally nothing to someone facing vastly more suffering." That is an enormous leap.
Someone living paycheck to paycheck is not the target of my argument. I am talking about people for whom donating a modest percentage would have very little effect on their flourishing.
Animal Products
More than 80 billion land animals are slaughtered for meat globally every year. FAO data put the reported total at approximately 83 billion in 2022.
That doesn't include fish or the countless other deaths associated with production systems. (Our World in Data)
Livestock accounts for ~80% of global agriculture land use, once grazing land and cropland used for animal feed are included.
However, meat, dairy, and farmed fish account for only 17% of global calories and 38% of global protein... (Our World in Data)
FAO estimates livestock emissions at 4.3 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent in 2023, which is the largest component of global agrifood-system emissions in its dataset. A separate FAO life-cycle assessment estimated livestock systems at ~12% of total human-caused greenhouse-gas emission. (FAOHome)
WHO also identifies the heavy use of antibiotics in food-producing animals, particularly intensive animal production, as contributing to antimicrobial resistance and recommends reducing medically important antibiotic use in food-producing animals (World Health Organization)
All things considered, this is an industry with consequences for tens of billions of sentient animals, land use, greenhouse-gas emissions, biodiversity and ecosystems, and human health.
And for many financially comfortable people, reducing their contributions requires something astonishingly mundane:
Eat some different meals...
Not starve, sacrifice your health, or never taste meat again. Maybe instead of eating animal products every meal of the day 7 days a week, substantially reduce them. Learn some different recipes, perhaps order something else occasionally, replace some meals. That is the level of sacrifice we're discussing.
Consider another thought experiment:
Suppose there are two restaurants.
At restaurant A, you order pork. You never see where it comes from, and twenty minutes, a delicious pork dish appears on your plate.
At restaurant B, the supply chain is exactly the same, however, the wall behind the kitchen is transparent.
When you order pork, you watch the pig being brought out, and you watch it panic in fear for its life.
You watch the animal being killed and butchered.
Suppose you watch its throat being cut and watch it bleed out, twitching after its death, then they prepare part of its body and place it on your plate. The same delicious pork dish.
I suspect the vast majority of us would find restaurant B horrifying..
Some would even refuse to eat.
Some might even tell the butcher to stop.
My question is, what morally relevant question did the wall change? The pig didn't suffer any more because you watched. It didn't suffer less because you didn't. The only thing that changed was your psychological experience. It didn't change the experience of the animal.
Modern food systems put huge walls between consumers and production, which explains why we might feel differently about the two restaurants, however, it doesn't make the underlying suffering disappear.
Another thought experiment:
Suppose someone takes your dog.
They kill him in front of you, butcher him, cooke him, and say, "don't worry, I really enjoy the taste and dog meat is a vital part of my diet."
Most people would regard this as a serious moral wrongdoing.
Change one variable: Instead of a dog, it's a pig or a chicken or a cow. Why has the moral calculation suddenly changed? I don't think saying "dogs are pets" solves the problem.
Of course you might have a stronger personal relationship with your dog, we all care about our families and those close to us more than strangers, however, special attachment doesn't eliminate the moral status of everyone outside of that attachment.
If someone said, "of course torturing your child is wrong, but this is a child I don't have a relationship with" we would immediately recognize that they have confused attachment with exclusive moral worth.
And if you think the wrongness comes only from the fact that it's your dog, replace your dog with a healthy stray dog you have never met. Is breeding, killing, and eating that dog for taste now morally insignificant?
So what does the dog possess that these other animals lack? Capacity to suffer? Fear? Social relationships? Intelligence? Preference to not experience pain? Other animals do not lack any of these.
If someone can identify a morally relevant difference that explains why inflicting severe suffering on one species for minor pleasure is unacceptable while doing something similar to another species is morally insignificant, I'm all for it, but saying "one is a dog and one is a pig" is not an argument.
"But I didn't personally kill the pig"
Correct. Buying meat is not the same as slaughtering an animal. The question is, what responsibility do you have when knowingly purchasing products whose production predictably requires animals to be bred and killed when reducing my demand would cost you comparatively little?
A consumer is further back in the causal chain, but "I paid someone else and didn't watch what happened" doesn't make the participation morally neutral.
Imagine I love fur coats, and producing the coats I like requires someone to severely abuse animals. It would be very weird to say "I didn't hurt them, I only created the demand and paid the people who did"
Being causally indirect can reduce responsibility, but it definitely doesn't reduce it to zero.
"One person eating less meat changes nothing"
This is a common and very frustrating obkection
Of course skipping one chicken sandwich doesn't cause a farmer somewhere to raise exactly one fewer chicken, farms are not like vending machines. They respond to aggregate demand. That means while the effect of one person's consumption is probabilistic and tiny, it does not mean the expected effect is literally zero.
If large numbers of consumers reduce demand, production responds, and enormous baseline numbers mean even partial reductions can have enormous welfare consequences.
With more than 80 billion land animals slaughtered yearly, we don't need universal veganism before reductions become significant.
"But plant agriculture kills animals too"
Yes. Of course no lifestyle produces literally zero harm. That doesn't mean all choices produce equal harm.
Also, land-use numbers are important here. Livestock requires grazing land AND enormous quanitities of crops grown as animal feed. Globally livestock uses ~80% of agricultural land while supplying a minority of calories. (Our World in Data)
So the fact that plant agriculture itself has environmental and animal costs is not an argument for ignoring the additional costs of feeding crops to animals then consuming the animals.
"Nothing is perfectly harmless" ≠ "therefore reducing harm is meaningless"
"There are thousands of other good things I could do"
True, you could volunteer, give blood, support family, reduce your emissions, mentor children, work in a valuable career, and do many other worthwhile things, but the existence of one moral obligation doesn't normally erase unrelated obligations.
If I tell you "You shouldn't abuse your dog" it isn't an answer to say "Well, I actually volunteer at a homeless shelter." Good actions aren't really moral credits that make other harms permissible. There can obviously be cases where someone's existing obligations consume so much of their resources that an additional demand is no longer "small" but for the ordinary financially comfortable person, I don't see how other possible good deeds establish that these obligations become zero.
Closing Remarks
Normality is not morality
Eating meat is normal, and spending all of your money on yourself, even when that amount is very high, is normal. Therefore, neither feels like wrongdoing.
However, history is full of socially ordinary behaviors that later generations regarded as morally indefensible.
I am not claiming that factory farming is equivalent to any particular historical atrocity, but what I am claiming is that the prevalence of a behavior is evidence about social norms, not that the behavior is morally justified. If billions of people participate in something, that might make it easier to participate, but that does not answer the moral question
Distance and invisibility
This is what bothers me the most. Put the malaria-stricken child directly in front of someone and make the cost trivial, and suddenly most would agree that failing to help is a huge moral failure.
Move the child thousands of miles away, turn them into a statistic, and now helping becomes above and beyond
Put a cow in someone's backyard, make them watch it suffer and die before dinner, and many would become horrified.
Move the pig into an industrial facility that they will never see or think about, put the meat into a neat package, and suddenly it's morally irrelevant.
However, distance does not make the suffering hurt less, neither does invisibility. These things change how strongly we perceive the suffering, but they certainly do no change how strongly the experience is for the victim. I do not think morality should just track the limitations of human empathy.
So here is exactly what I believe
If you are financially comfortable enough that giving away a modest fraction of your income would not undermine your security, responsibilities or flourishing, I think donating nothing to effective causes is morally wrong.
Not just unkind, but wrong.
If you consume substantial quantities of animal products, have other practical and healthy alternatives available, and could reduce your consumption at relatively little cost to your wellbeing, refusing to make any reduction is morally wrong.
Again, not just less ethical than veganism, but wrong.
I don't believe morality requires perfection, self-destruction, or donating every spare dollar, but I also reject the opposite extreme that morality somehow requires literally zero sacrifice from comfortable people when tiny sacrifices can prevent or reduce suffering that SIGNIFICANTLY outweighs the inconvenience imposed on them.
What would change my view
I would change my view if someone can give a reason why severe but distant suffering creates no obligation even when the personal cost of helping is small, why knowingly contributing to animal suffering through consumer demand creates no obligation to reduce that contribution when there are available-yet-mildly-inconvenient substitutes, or why my general low-cost/high-benefit principle fails
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