To all the people people who don't believe russia hitting civilians deliberately here is a footage of a shahed drone flying uninterruptedly into a residential building:

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Today at 12 p.m. ET, U.S. forces began striking Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets in Iran. The strikes follow recent attempted attacks by the IRGC against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and against American service members deployed to the region.

Possible MCI

CENTCOM:

“US Forces completed a round of airstrikes against Iranian military targets.

Air defense sites, radar systems, maritime assets and facilities, mine laying capabilities, and communications sites were targeted.

The strikes follow recent attempted attacks by the IRGC against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and against American service members.”

**Translation**

A recent research report revealed that Sudan, and especially its Red Sea coast, has become a new link in a military and logistical network connecting Iran to the Houthi group in Yemen, taking advantage of the Sudanese war and the openness of the Port Sudan authority, supported by Islamist groups, to Iranian military support.

According to the report, the relationship is no longer limited to supplying the Sudanese army with drones, ammunition and radar systems, but is suspected to have developed into a network that includes transporting weapons and personnel across the Red Sea, using Port Sudan as a logistics and financing hub, as well as the possibility of Houthi and Iranian experts participating in training Sudanese forces on operating drones and manufacturing models of them locally.

The report was issued by the American “Century Foundation”, as part of its “Century International” project, under the title: “From a Marginal Ring to a Network Hub: The Houthis in Africa”.

The report team based its findings on approximately one hundred interviews with military, security, and intelligence officials and sources in Sudan, Yemen, and regional and Western countries, in addition to satellite images, ship tracking data, port and shipping records, anonymized mobile phone traffic data, and technical analysis of weapons and drones.

# Iran's return through the gateway of war

The report argues that the war that broke out in Sudan in April 2023 gave Iran a low-cost opportunity to restore its influence in a country that has been one of its political and military arenas in the region for decades.

Tehran had established close ties with the regime of former President Omar al-Bashir, and cooperated with the army, security services and the defense industries system, before Khartoum severed its diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016, in the context of a regional alignment with Saudi Arabia, before they resumed diplomatic relations in October 2023, months after the outbreak of war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, at a time when the army was suffering from a severe shortage of drones and the air capabilities necessary to confront the widespread deployment of the Rapid Support Forces.

The report states that, following the restoration of relations, Iran began supplying the Sudanese army with Mohajer-6 drones, ammunition, and radar systems, in addition to sending members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to work as trainers and operators of the military systems.

The report attributes a significant part of the field transformation that enabled the army to recapture large areas of Khartoum in early 2025 to the improvement in its capabilities in the field of drones, particularly Iranian systems.

These conclusions partially overlap with what the US Treasury Department announced in October 2024, when it said that the Sudanese military had prioritized acquiring weapons, including Iranian drones, and that military and diplomatic support from Iran and Russia had contributed to strengthening its capabilities and weakening the incentives for de-escalation.

# Islamic organization within the army

According to the report, Iranian support did not pass through Sudanese military institutions alone, but through an influential organization within the army linked to elements of the Islamic movement that ruled the country during al-Bashir’s era, and some of its members retained influential positions within the military and security apparatus after the fall of the regime in 2019.

The report places the defense industries system at the heart of this network, noting that its Director General, Mirghani Idris Suleiman, played a pivotal role in arms procurement and the development of military industries.
The United States imposed sanctions on Mirghani Idris in October 2024, accusing him of leading the army's efforts to acquire weapons, including Iranian equipment and drones, and considering the Defense Industries System to be the army's main arm in production and armament.

The report says that the Islamist network within the army directed some of the Iranian military support to armed groups fighting alongside it, most notably the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, which was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in September 2025, saying that it had received training and weapons from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and that its members were involved in arbitrary arrests, torture and field executions of people suspected of being linked to the Rapid Support Forces.

This episode is of particular importance, according to the report, because it allows Iran to build influence that is not based solely on the official relationship with the army leadership, but on direct links with an armed ideological faction within the ruling military alliance.

# Houthis enter Sudan

The report states that the Houthis joined this path in mid-2024, as a junior partner to Iran, before their role gradually expanded into transportation, training, and logistics operations.

According to interviews conducted by researchers with Yemeni, Western, and regional officials, the Houthis transferred at least three shipments of small arms and light weapons to the Sudanese army on behalf of Iran.
Several sources told the report that Houthi elements were present in Port Sudan, saying they were using the city as a hub for transportation, finance, and logistics management, with weapons and personnel moving in both directions between the Sudanese coast and Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.

# Ships turn off tracking devices

The report's authors attempted to test the accounts related to arms movement across the Red Sea by comparing source statements with Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, satellite imagery, and port records.

In one instance, researchers spotted a ship that had previously operated on a regular trade route between Jeddah and Port Sudan, before it switched off its tracking device off the Sudanese coast during May and June 2025.

The ship then headed to Yemen and docked east of the Ras Issa oil terminal, at an unofficial berth set up by the Houthis after US airstrikes damaged shipping facilities in the port of Hodeidah.

Satellite images showed a security cordon and trucks near the dock before the ship's arrival, while its cargo, estimated at 3,500 tons, did not appear in official import records. Yemeni officials interviewed by the research team said the ship was carrying weapons.

The report quoted Sudanese, Western, and security sources as saying that a force belonging to a faction within the Sudanese army seized in May 2026 a shipment of small arms believed to have arrived from Yemen and destined for Houthi allies within the army and for Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

# Movement of individuals between Sudan and Yemen

The suspicion isn't limited to the movement of ships and weapons. The research team used mobile phone traffic data to track the movement of people between Sudan and Yemen.

The analysis, according to the report, showed that at least one person traveled by air from Egypt to Port Sudan in August 2025, and from there moved to an unofficial landing site controlled by the Houthis on the Yemeni Red Sea coast.

Although this data does not reveal the identity of the person or the nature of his mission, the report considers it technical evidence that supports the sources’ accounts of the use of the Sudanese coast to transport elements and experts between the two sides of the Red Sea.

The Yemeni authorities were also quoted as saying that, at the beginning of 2024, they had documented three large fishing boats transporting more than seven thousand pieces of weaponry, along with mortar shells, from the port of Hodeidah to Sudan.

Houthi transfers Iranian military technology to the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan. Houthi experts in Sudan?

The report suggests that the relationship may have gone beyond the stage of arms transfer and logistical services to include technical cooperation and the transfer of military knowledge.

Yemeni, Western, and regional sources, as well as sources based in Sudan and Port Sudan, reported that the Houthis sent experienced engineers and operations personnel to work alongside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in training Sudanese forces to operate and manufacture Iranian drones.

In this context, the Sudanese drone “Safaroq” stands out, which was unveiled by the Defense Industries System during the International Defense Industries Exhibition in Istanbul in July 2025, and presented as a locally manufactured drone that has already entered service.

# “Safaroq” and “Qasif”... a striking similarity

The report conducted a technical comparison between the Sudanese “Safaroq” drone and the Iranian “Ababil-T” aircraft, which is manufactured by the Houthis and used in Yemen under the name “Qasef-2K.” The comparison revealed an almost complete match in design, dimensions, engine type, manufacturing materials, and warhead capacity.

The Safarouq is 2.88 meters long, compared to 2.90 meters for the Ababil-T, while its wingspan is 3.30 meters, compared to between 3.25 and 3.30 meters for the Iranian drone. Both drones use a piston-propeller engine with approximately 25 horsepower and are made of composite materials. The Safarouq carries a warhead weighing between 20 and 40 kilograms, while the Ababil-T carries between 30 and 40 kilograms.

According to weapons experts consulted by the report's authors, the Safarouq is likely a variant of the Ababil-T. The report indicates that the Houthis have extensive experience manufacturing this type of drone using components purchased from global markets, making them, technically speaking, potential candidates to train Sudanese factions in its production and operation.
Interests that transcend sectarian differences

The cooperation between the Houthis, who belong to the Zaidi sect, and Sunni Islamists within the Sudanese army raises questions, especially since the army has previously sent forces to participate in the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen.

However, the report argues that current military and political interests have prevailed over sectarian differences, as seen in the Houthis' relations with other groups in the region.

According to him, the Islamist faction within the army needs weapons, technology, and external support to maintain its influence within the military coalition, at a time when it faces increasing international sanctions and pressure. Conversely, the Houthis need new and secure routes after traditional smuggling routes through the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab have become subject to increased monitoring and interception.

The report also points to historical ties dating back to the 1990s, when the movement's founder, Hussein al-Houthi, lived in Sudan for several years. It quotes a Yemeni official as saying that during that time, al-Houthi established contacts with the Iranian embassy in Khartoum, which helped arrange his travel to Iran before he returned to Yemen with a more radical ideology.
The report also mentions accounts of the presence of Houthi-linked elements in Sudan during the six wars waged by the movement against the Yemeni government between 2004 and 2010.

#  Risks within the army and the Red Sea

The danger of these relationships extends beyond simply providing the Sudanese army with more weapons. The report warns that Iran and the Houthis' direct ties to an Islamist faction within the military establishment could deepen divisions within the army and provide that faction with sources of arms and training relatively independent of the official command.

According to the report, these capabilities could become a crucial asset if an internal conflict breaks out between the components of the military alliance itself, or if the army leadership is subjected to external pressure to sever its ties with Iran and the Houthis.

Furthermore, establishing a Houthi presence in Port Sudan would give the group a foothold on the western bank of the Red Sea, provide it with an alternative supply route to the traditional controlled routes, and place Sudanese ports within a network of regional conflict stretching from Iran and Yemen to the Horn of Africa.
A network is forming and Iranian influence is expanding.

The most important conclusion of the report is that Sudan is no longer just a recipient of Iranian weapons, but may be becoming part of a wider network for the transfer of weapons, personnel and military technology across the Red Sea.

The shipments attributed to the Houthis, the suspicious maritime movements, the alleged presence of their elements in Port Sudan, and the similarity between the “Safaroq” and “Qasef” drones, point to a pattern that warrants an independent international investigation and stricter monitoring of ports and drone component supply routes.

The report warns that ignoring current indicators could allow the relationship to move from limited logistical cooperation to a more entrenched military partnership, with Sudan becoming a new hub in the Iran-Houthi network, and an additional arena for regional conflict that threatens to prolong the internal war and further destabilize Red Sea security.